Learning objectives: Describe how securitized and structured products were used by investor groups and describe the consequences of their increased use. Describe how the financial crisis triggered a series of worldwide financial and economic consequences. Distinguish between funding liquidity and market liquidity and explain how the evaporation of liquidity can lead to a financial crisis. Analyze how an increase in counterparty credit risk can generate additional funding needs and possible systemic risk
Questions:
701.1. Brunnermeier's event logbook is a succinct narrative of the unfolding of the global financial crisis and is organized according to the following ten mini-chapters:
I. Subprime mortgage crisis begins (February 2007): the trigger for the liquidity crisis was an increase in subprime mortgage defaults that was arguably first noticed in the ABX price index
II. Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP, July 2007): amid widespread concern about how to value structured products and an erosion of confidence in the reliability of ratings, the market for short-term ABCP began to dry up
III. The LIBOR, Repo, and Federal Funds Markets (August 2007): the TED spread, and other related credit spreads, began to surge upward
IV. Central banks step forward (August and September 2007): to alleviate the liquidity crunch, the Federal Reserve reduced the discount rate by half a percentage point to 5.75 percent on August 17, 2007, broadened the type of collateral that banks could post, and lengthened the lending horizon to 30 days; on September 18, the Fed lowered the federal funds rate by half a percentage point (50 basis points) to 4.75 percent and the discount rate to 5.25 percent.
V. Continuing write down of mortgage-related securities (October through November 2007)
VI. Monoline Insurers (January 2018): Fitch downgrades Ambac which has the result of "unnerving worldwide financial markets"
VII. Bear Stearns (March 2008): this financial institution essentially experiences a "bank run"
VIII. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (July to September 2008): after making the implicit government guarantee explicit in July, as the stock price of Fannie and Freddie slid further, on September 7th government officials put them into federal conservatorship
IX. Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and AIG (September 2008 and October 2008)
X. Coordinated Bailout, Stock Market Decline, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and Citibank (September 2008 to December 2008)
About this particular narrative, which of the following is a TRUE statement?
a. The Federal Reserve failed to take significant actions during 2007 and 2008 to mitigate the crisis
b. The crisis was difficult for anybody to anticipate prior the 4th quarter of 2008 because key credit spreads did not widen until then; even the earlier ABX index price drop was a good omen akin to a lower VIX
c. The crisis was self-contained within financial markets as Wall Street's crisis (in financial markets) did NOT spill over into Main Street (the non-financial economy)
d. While Bear Stearns and AIG were both bailed out and Lehman Brothers was not bailed out, all three firms were highly interconnected to counterparties around the globe
701.2. Brunnermeier's paper is concerned with amplifying mechanisms and liquidity spirals. He asks how liquidity shock(s) can get amplified into a full-blown financial crisis when liquidity evaporates. According to him each of the following is such an amplifying mechanism with the potential to exacerbate (ie., make worse) a crisis or otherwise contribute to systemic risk EXCEPT which is NOT really part of this problem?
a. Low market liquidity risk where market liquidity has three sub-forms of market liquidity: (i) the bid–ask spread, (ii) market depth, and (iii) market resiliency
b. Multilateral netting agreements which tend to create gridlock risk--which is a subclass of liquidity risk--due to network effects especially if a bureaucratic central authority attempts to unrealistically keep track of all positions
c. Low funding liquidity where funding liquidity risk includes three forms, each of which are detrimental when assets can only be sold as fire sale prices: (i) margin/haircut funding risk, (ii) rollover risk, and (iii) redemption risk
d. Precautionary hoarding by lenders who have limited capital and where the risk of such precautionary hoarding increases when either the likelihood of interim shocks increases or when funds are expected to be difficult to obtain.
701.3. Which is the following statements about liquidity is TRUE?
a. After a large price drops, lending haircuts and margins tend to increase
b. Funding liquidity refers to the transfer of the asset with its entire cash flow
c. Market liquidity is like issuing debt, equity, or any other financial contract against a cash flow generated by an asset or trading strategy
d. An investor who wants to maintain a constant leverage ratio (without injecting new equity) when the existing asset value drops rapidly can borrow to purchase additional assets
Answers here:
Questions:
701.1. Brunnermeier's event logbook is a succinct narrative of the unfolding of the global financial crisis and is organized according to the following ten mini-chapters:
I. Subprime mortgage crisis begins (February 2007): the trigger for the liquidity crisis was an increase in subprime mortgage defaults that was arguably first noticed in the ABX price index
II. Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP, July 2007): amid widespread concern about how to value structured products and an erosion of confidence in the reliability of ratings, the market for short-term ABCP began to dry up
III. The LIBOR, Repo, and Federal Funds Markets (August 2007): the TED spread, and other related credit spreads, began to surge upward
IV. Central banks step forward (August and September 2007): to alleviate the liquidity crunch, the Federal Reserve reduced the discount rate by half a percentage point to 5.75 percent on August 17, 2007, broadened the type of collateral that banks could post, and lengthened the lending horizon to 30 days; on September 18, the Fed lowered the federal funds rate by half a percentage point (50 basis points) to 4.75 percent and the discount rate to 5.25 percent.
V. Continuing write down of mortgage-related securities (October through November 2007)
VI. Monoline Insurers (January 2018): Fitch downgrades Ambac which has the result of "unnerving worldwide financial markets"
VII. Bear Stearns (March 2008): this financial institution essentially experiences a "bank run"
VIII. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (July to September 2008): after making the implicit government guarantee explicit in July, as the stock price of Fannie and Freddie slid further, on September 7th government officials put them into federal conservatorship
IX. Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and AIG (September 2008 and October 2008)
X. Coordinated Bailout, Stock Market Decline, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and Citibank (September 2008 to December 2008)
About this particular narrative, which of the following is a TRUE statement?
a. The Federal Reserve failed to take significant actions during 2007 and 2008 to mitigate the crisis
b. The crisis was difficult for anybody to anticipate prior the 4th quarter of 2008 because key credit spreads did not widen until then; even the earlier ABX index price drop was a good omen akin to a lower VIX
c. The crisis was self-contained within financial markets as Wall Street's crisis (in financial markets) did NOT spill over into Main Street (the non-financial economy)
d. While Bear Stearns and AIG were both bailed out and Lehman Brothers was not bailed out, all three firms were highly interconnected to counterparties around the globe
701.2. Brunnermeier's paper is concerned with amplifying mechanisms and liquidity spirals. He asks how liquidity shock(s) can get amplified into a full-blown financial crisis when liquidity evaporates. According to him each of the following is such an amplifying mechanism with the potential to exacerbate (ie., make worse) a crisis or otherwise contribute to systemic risk EXCEPT which is NOT really part of this problem?
a. Low market liquidity risk where market liquidity has three sub-forms of market liquidity: (i) the bid–ask spread, (ii) market depth, and (iii) market resiliency
b. Multilateral netting agreements which tend to create gridlock risk--which is a subclass of liquidity risk--due to network effects especially if a bureaucratic central authority attempts to unrealistically keep track of all positions
c. Low funding liquidity where funding liquidity risk includes three forms, each of which are detrimental when assets can only be sold as fire sale prices: (i) margin/haircut funding risk, (ii) rollover risk, and (iii) redemption risk
d. Precautionary hoarding by lenders who have limited capital and where the risk of such precautionary hoarding increases when either the likelihood of interim shocks increases or when funds are expected to be difficult to obtain.
701.3. Which is the following statements about liquidity is TRUE?
a. After a large price drops, lending haircuts and margins tend to increase
b. Funding liquidity refers to the transfer of the asset with its entire cash flow
c. Market liquidity is like issuing debt, equity, or any other financial contract against a cash flow generated by an asset or trading strategy
d. An investor who wants to maintain a constant leverage ratio (without injecting new equity) when the existing asset value drops rapidly can borrow to purchase additional assets
Answers here:
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