Nanchary,
They partly justify this by saying the function is not only about the probability of default, but deterioration (downgrades): "maturity adjustments can be interpreted as anticipations of additional capital requirements due to downgrades."
So, from the IRB note (p 10)
"Economically, maturity adjustments may also be explained as a consequence of mark-to-market (MtM) valuation of credits. Loans with high PDs have a lower market value today than loans with low PDs with the same face value, as investors take into account the Expected Loss, as well as different risk-adjusted discount factors. The maturity effect would relate to potential down-grades and loss of market value of loans. Maturity effects are stronger with low PDs than high PDs: intuition tells that low PD borrowers have, so to speak, more “potential†and more room for down-gradings than high PD borrowers (mine). Consistent with these considerations, the Basel maturity adjustments are a function of both maturity and PD, and they are higher (in relative terms) for low PD than for high PD borrowers.
In others words, they imply the "average" cumulative transition matrix would bear this out: the row of AAA cumulative downgrade transition probabilities would increase, in relative terms, faster than the BB row, over longer horizons (I can't reference that, it's just their implication)
The other inference you could possibly draw here is: this is another built-in conservatism. By "penalizing" longer maturities, they offset the low capital requirement for highly rateds.
David